This article explains the migration-law situation of Russian and Belarusian nationals in Switzerland after the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Swiss practice operates within a double entanglement: on the one hand, the adoption of the EU sanctions packages via the Embargo Act, with effects on entry and asset aspects; on the other hand, the asylum-law assessment of politically persecuted or conscripted Russian and Belarusian nationals. A self-contained special practice in the sense of a codified special regime does not exist — as far as is officially published; the relevant practice is found scattered across SEM directives, SECO lists and individual rulings of the Federal Administrative Court (FAC).

The article describes the law in force and the observable administrative practice. It assesses neither the sanctions policy nor the geopolitical events underlying it, and it provides no legal information relating to an individual case (see section 16).

1. Overview — what has changed since 24 February 2022

With the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Switzerland adapted its traditional practice towards EU sanctions regimes. After the Federal Council initially reacted with restraint, at the end of February 2022 it decided on the adoption of the EU sanctions packages against the Russian Federation. In legal-technical terms, this adoption takes place via the Embargo Act (EmbA, SR 946.231) and is given substantive form in the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (hereinafter Ukraine Ordinance, SR 946.231.176.72).

For migration-law practice, several shifts result from this:

  • Existing permits remain in principle untouched — the sanctions mechanism does not target the ordinary foreign-nationals permit regime, but entry bans against listed persons and economic restrictions.
  • The asylum field acquires a new profile — the recognition of Russian conscripts and Belarusian demonstrators as politically persecuted persons has changed the composition of applications compared with the pre-2022 period; the concrete quotas are to be consulted in the continuously updated SEM asylum statistics and are not frozen here.
  • Visa restrictions — the ordinary Schengen visa practice has become markedly more restrictive towards Russian nationals; the EU–Russia visa facilitation agreement was fully suspended on the EU side over the course of 2022, and Switzerland followed the more restrictive line. The visa policy in force at any given time can be obtained through the competent Swiss representation abroad and the SEM.

Belarus is systematically dealt with alongside in this presentation, because the sanctions mechanics are designed analogously (via a separate ordinance) and asylum-law practice has developed similarly since the protests of August 2020. Where Russia and Belarus diverge, this is expressly indicated.

2. Legal basis

The migration-law relevance of sanctions results from several legal layers that interlock.

2.1 Embargo Act (EmbA, SR 946.231)

The Embargo Act (EmbA, SR 946.231) of 22 March 2002 empowers the Federal Council to order coercive measures to enforce sanctions under international public law. Under Art. 1 (SR 946.231), the Federal Council may issue coercive measures to enforce sanctions decided by the UN, the OSCE or Switzerland's most important trading partners in order to safeguard compliance with international public law. All post-2022 sanctions ordinances against Russia and Belarus are based on this. The exact wording of the consolidated version can be obtained from the Fedlex page linked in the source reference; a literal reproduction is deliberately omitted here, because the consolidated version is subject to amendment.

2.2 Ukraine Ordinance (SR 946.231.176.72)

The Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (Ukraine Ordinance, SR 946.231.176.72) is the central instrument in migration law. It lists the sanctioned persons subject to an entry ban into Switzerland and the Schengen area, and orders the financial restrictions (freezing of assets, prohibition of certain economic transactions). Its annexes are updated with each new EU sanctions round — typically within a few working days of the EU adjustment.

2.3 AsylA (SR 142.31) and FNIA (SR 142.20)

The Asylum Act (AsylA, SR 142.31) and the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration (FNIA, SR 142.20) form the legal field in which the migration-law assessment actually takes place. There is no autonomous lex specialis for Russian or Belarusian nationals in the AsylA or the FNIA; SEM practice and FAC case law operate within the general framework, with country-specifically adapted assessment of evidence.

2.4 FIS situation report (DDPS)

3. Sanctions packages — layering 2022 to 2026

Since February 2022 the EU has adopted a series of sanctions packages. As of the reference date of 18.05.2026, a double-digit number of packages is in force; the European Commission handles the numbering inconsistently (packages and supplementary legal acts are in part counted separately), which is why a precise package figure is dispensed with here. The consolidation in force at any given time can be obtained from the linked SECO page. Each package typically comprises:

  • Sector-specific restrictions (energy, financial services, armaments, luxury goods, technology transfer).
  • Personal sanctions with an entry ban into the Schengen area and freezing of assets.
  • Service bans for Swiss companies vis-à-vis sanctioned actors.

Switzerland typically adopts the packages by way of ordinance within a few days to a few weeks after EU adoption. A largely congruent adoption is the rule; selective adjustments are made where Swiss procedural law (for example in the objection procedure against a listing) diverges.

For migration-law practice, the following are relevant within this layering:

  • The consolidated list of persons of the SECO (parallel to the EU consolidation) — this list is publicly accessible and contains the natural and legal persons subject to an entry ban and asset freeze.
  • The annexes of the Ukraine Ordinance with the respectively covered categories of persons, sectors and exceptions.

Concrete lists are not reproduced here, because they are updated weekly or more frequently. The version current at any given time can be obtained from the SECO page linked in the source reference; use of this article in production presupposes a selective verification against the day's version.

4. Effects on Russian and Belarusian nationals in Switzerland

In migration-law practice, four constellations can be distinguished whose legal situation differs fundamentally.

4.1 Pre-2022 permit holders

Russian and Belarusian nationals who were resident in Switzerland before 24.02.2022 and who hold an ordinary FNIA permit (B, C, L, G — third-country regime) retain their permits in principle unchanged. A revocation based solely on nationality or solely on the sanctions regime does not take place, provided the person concerned does not themselves appear on the SECO sanctions list.

To be noted in practice:

  • Extension and renewal procedures run in the ordinary manner; no publicly known instruction has been issued to the cantonal migration offices to treat these procedures differently in the case of Russian or Belarusian nationality.
  • Existing C settlement permits are particularly entrenched — a revocation based on nationality alone has no basis in the law. A revocation of a permit always presupposes the existence of a statutory ground for revocation in the individual case (for the settlement permit, Art. 63 FNIA, SR 142.20) and not nationality as such.

4.2 Post-2022 new applications

Persons who apply for a residence title in Switzerland for the first time after 24.02.2022 experience an increased intensity of examination in practice. This concerns in particular:

  • Labour-market admission (third-country gainful employment under Art. 18-21 FNIA, SR 142.20) — a more precise assessment of the employer-side priority proof (priority for domestic workers).
  • Residence without gainful employment (pensioners) under Art. 28 FNIA (SR 142.20) — a more precise assessment of the financial circumstances and the origin of the funds with regard to the sanctions regime.
  • Family reunification (see section 9) — additional hurdles in the issuance of the visa in the country of origin.

4.3 Sanctions-listed persons

A procedure for delisting persons listed in error or wrongly exists; a corresponding application must be addressed to the SECO, with a legal remedy to the Federal Administrative Court. The procedure applicable in the individual case is to be clarified with the SECO (see section 6).

4.4 Tourist visas and short stays

The ordinary Schengen visa practice towards Russian nationals has been markedly more restrictive since the suspension of the EU–Russia visa facilitation agreement (2022). Switzerland follows the EU line. Observable consequences are higher visa fees, longer processing times, stricter document checks and a more reserved willingness on the part of the consular representations to issue multiple-entry visas.

For Belarusian nationals the practice is similar, albeit — as far as observable — somewhat less restrictive. The fee in force at any given time and the current processing modalities are to be clarified with the competent Swiss representation abroad; concrete amounts are not frozen here, as these data are among the most volatile subject matter of the article.

5. Asylum applications of Russian and Belarusian nationals

Since 2022 a discernible increase in Russian and Belarusian asylum applications is to be observed. The exact case numbers and quotas are to be consulted in the publicly accessible SEM asylum statistics, which are referenced here but not frozen.

5.1 Recognition practice and ground for asylum

The recognition practice for Russian and Belarusian asylum applications has been more open since 2022 than in the prior period. The typical ground for recognition lies in:

  • Political persecution within the meaning of Art. 3 AsylA (SR 142.31) — in the case of demonstrated opposition, journalism or human-rights activity.
  • Refusal of military service with a political connotation — for Russian reservists or conscripts with a demonstrable rejection of the war of aggression (see section 7).
  • Reflex persecution — family members of persecuted activists, insofar as persecution threatens them themselves because of their proximity to the persecuted person.

A systematic presentation of asylum-law terminology is found in the glossary on the Asylum Act.

5.2 Belarusian post-2020 protesters

After the mass protests in Belarus from August 2020, the recognition practice for Belarusian applicants with documented protest participation has become markedly more open. The FAC case law has confirmed the persecutory character of the Belarusian repression practice in several rulings; the relevant file references and dates are kept up to date in the glossary on the Asylum Act and are to be compared there against the current case law.

5.3 Duration of the procedure and status during the procedure

During the ongoing asylum procedure, the N permit (asylum seekers) is issued — see the N permit during the asylum procedure. In the case of a positive asylum decision, recognition as a refugee follows, with the corresponding residence title (see recognised refugee in Switzerland). In the case of a rejection of the asylum application, but in the presence of obstacles to enforcement, provisional admission (F permit) may be ordered — see provisional admission (F permit).

6. Sanctions-listed persons — procedure and legal protection

The listing of a natural or legal person on the annexes of the Ukraine Ordinance (SR 946.231.176.72) is an administrative measure with the character of a ruling. It as a rule follows the EU listing automatically (adoption of the EU list into the Swiss annex).

Legal protection:

  • Application for delisting with the competent federal body (SECO); depending on the constellation, the participation of further bodies is required.
  • Appeal to the Federal Administrative Court against the rejection of a delisting application.
  • Mirror effect of the EU listing — a delisting on the EU list typically leads to delisting on the Swiss list.

Delimitation of the advisory field: sanctions-delisting procedures as a rule constitute an autonomous specialist field of external-economic and sanctions law and not of classic migration law. A specialised representation with sanctions and external-economic-law expertise is appropriate here. This article refers to the topic without advising on it in the individual case (anti-scope, see section 16).

7. Reservists and deserters — asylum-law assessment

Since Russia's partial mobilisation in September 2022, the constellation of the conscripted Russian reservist is a frequent set of facts in the asylum field. Swiss practice differentiates:

  • Simple refusal of military service does not, according to settled FAC case law, on its own establish any refugee status within the meaning of Art. 3 AsylA (SR 142.31).
  • Refusal of military service in the context of a war of aggression contrary to international public law can, by contrast, establish refugee status, insofar as the threatened sanction (criminal proceedings, prison sentence) can, in the individual case, qualify as politically motivated persecution.
  • Documented call-up notices are a central means of evidence; without them, proof of the threatened persecution is more difficult to furnish.

A consolidated FAC guideline on the status of Russian reservists is, as far as can be seen, still in development; the assessment is carried out on a case-by-case basis. The relevant file references are kept up to date in the glossary on the Asylum Act and are to be compared there against the current case law.

For Belarusian deserters or refusers of military service, the constellation is rarer, because Belarus is not a party to the war to the same extent; the analogous assessment applies in the case of a demonstrable political connotation.

8. Dual nationals and departure from Russia and Belarus

Departure from Russia and Belarus has become increasingly difficult since 2022. Practical aspects:

  • Direct commercial flight connections between Russia and Switzerland are suspended; usual travel routes lead via hubs in third countries (for example Turkey or the United Arab Emirates).
  • Passport renewal at a Russian or Belarusian representation abroad is administratively burdensome and, in some constellations (political activity, open criminal proceedings in the home country), de facto excluded.
  • Dual nationals with an additional EU or third-country nationality are regularly better positioned — entry takes place on the third-country passport, the applicable visa regime is determined according to this further nationality.
  • Exclusively Russian or Belarusian nationality without a further passport is the most difficult constellation. A travel document for foreign nationals may be applied for in accordance with Art. 59 FNIA (SR 142.20) and the associated implementing provisions, in order to reduce dependence on the home-country passport. The SEM practice applicable in the individual case regarding the issuance of such documents is to be clarified with the SEM.

9. Family reunification of Russian and Belarusian nationals

Family reunification is governed by the ordinary FNIA provisions. The sanctions mechanics do not directly affect these prescriptions, but influence enforcement.

9.1 Pre-2022 permit holders

Anyone who, as a Russian or Belarusian national, obtained a B or C permit before 24.02.2022 may apply for family reunification under the relevant FNIA provisions — for holders of a settlement permit under Art. 43 FNIA (SR 142.20), for holders of a residence permit under Art. 44 FNIA (SR 142.20). The conditions (common dwelling, secured maintenance, no permanent dependence on social assistance, language requirements depending on the constellation) apply in the regular manner.

9.2 Post-2022 new applications

For new applications, the conditions are in practice examined more precisely, in particular:

  • Securing of maintenance — the funding endowment is documented in more detail.
  • Proof of income — for income originating from Russia, compliance questions are additionally examined (sanctions conformity of the payment flows).
  • Origin of the funds — for assets, compatibility with the sanctions regime is examined.

9.3 Visa issuance in the country of origin

Even with a positive preliminary decision by the cantonal migration office, the issuance of the visa at a Swiss representation abroad in the country of origin is difficult in practice; the consular representations apply the more restrictive post-2022 standard. The current processing modalities are to be clarified with the competent representation.

10. Naturalisation of Russian and Belarusian nationals

The ordinary naturalisation requirements are governed by the Swiss Citizenship Act (SCA, SR 141.0) and the Swiss Citizenship Ordinance (SCO, SR 141.01); they apply unchanged to Russian and Belarusian applicants — see the naturalisation paths in Switzerland and the glossary on the Swiss Citizenship Act. A tightening or easing on account of the sanctions is not provided for by law.

The substantive requirements result in particular from the provisions on the duration of residence and the integration criteria of the SCA (see Art. 9 SCA, SR 141.0, on the duration of residence, and Art. 11-12 SCA, SR 141.0, on the substantive requirements and the integration criteria). The language requirement, by contrast, is regulated in the Swiss Citizenship Ordinance (SCO, SR 141.01) — in its Art. 6 (SR 141.01). The Act and the Ordinance are two separate enactments and are deliberately not conflated here.

Practice observation:

  • The duration of the procedure exceeds, in individual cantons, the average for comparable third-country applicants.
  • A rejection based on nationality alone is legally not admissible — the SCA (SR 141.0) knows no nationality filter.

11. Return to Russia or Belarus

The return to the country of origin is, for several categories of persons, practically or legally difficult:

  • Recognised refugees typically lose, upon a return to the persecuting state — even for only short-term visits — refugee status, because the need for protection may be assessed as having lapsed by implication. Whether and to what extent the authorities tolerate short stays based on humanitarian grounds is a question of individual-case assessment and is to be clarified with the SEM.
  • F permit holders (provisional admission) are subject to similar restrictions; a return trip to the country of origin raises the question of the lapse of the obstacles to enforcement.
  • Holders of an ordinary B or C permit without a ground for asylum may in principle travel freely; the personal risk situation upon return (for example the arrest of politically active persons, mobilisation) is a separate question outside the narrower migration-law framework.

11.1 Return-assistance programmes

The Confederation's voluntary-return and reintegration programmes (return assistance) are in principle open to recognised refugees and provisionally admitted persons in the case of voluntary return; for mere permit holders without a ground for asylum they are not accessible. The designation, sponsoring body and concrete conditions of the programmes current at any given time are to be clarified with the SEM and are not frozen here.

12. Tax and banking aspects — interface without advice

Three interfaces are frequently present in migration-law practice, but do not belong to the advisory field of this platform (anti-scope, see section 16):

  • Double taxation agreements (DTA): the DTA with Russia is, according to the publicly available state, formally still in force; individual provisions are, in the light of the sanctions, applied de facto in a restricted manner. The application state in force at any given time is to be clarified with the competent tax authority. For Belarus a separate DTA exists.
  • Swiss banking business: Swiss banks have introduced enhanced due-diligence checks (KYC) for Russian and Belarusian clients. Account openings are made difficult; existing accounts are in part subject to increased compliance requirements.
  • Asset transfers: money flows from Russia to Switzerland are subject to full sanctions-compliance checking; in numerous constellations a transfer is de facto impossible.

These topics are not advised on at SwissImmigrationPro — they fall within the competence of tax advice, banking advice as well as sanctions and compliance legal advice (see section 16).

13. FIS situation report and background check

The FIS situation report (annual publication of the Federal Intelligence Service) has, since 2022, markedly raised the threat assessment vis-à-vis state actors. The exact wording of the respective edition is to be consulted in the FIS publication linked in the source reference; the report typically appears in early summer and deals with the previous year.

For migration-law practice, this means:

  • A more intensive background check by the SEM, the cantonal migration offices and, where applicable, further federal bodies in the case of initial applications and naturalisations.
  • Longer procedure durations in security-relevant constellations.

The publicly available SEM directives can be obtained from the SEM website and are authoritative for the practice current at any given time.

  1. The existence of an explicit SEM directive for the treatment of Russian and Belarusian applicants in the sense of a codified enhanced-scrutiny procedure — as far as can be seen not officially published; at most administration-internal.
  2. Current recognition quotas for Russian and Belarusian asylum applications — reconstructable via the SEM asylum statistics, but volatile as a snapshot and deliberately not frozen in this article.
  3. Concrete standards of the intelligence-service background check in permit and naturalisation procedures — probably classified or administration-internal; not public.
  4. The exact number of EU sanctions packages as of the reference date — the method of counting is non-uniform; instead of a falsely precise figure, reference is made to the SECO consolidation.
  5. Current SEM practice for nationals of Russia or Belarus resident in Switzerland before 2022 in renewals — no public special directive is discernible; de facto ordinary practice.
  6. The concrete enforcement path upon the listing of a person who holds an existing permit in Switzerland — the legal consequence (revocation, suspension, de facto suspension of effect) is not unambiguously codified in a public norm.
  7. The application of the DTA with Russia in the light of the sanctions — formally in force, the de facto scope of application is ambiguous and to be clarified with the tax authority.

This list is not exhaustive; it marks the knowledge gaps identified at the time this article was prepared. An update takes place at every refresh trigger.

15. References and cross-links

The following articles of the SwissImmigrationPro platform are related to this article:

16. Anti-scope — what this article does not accomplish

A politically sensitive topic such as the Russia/Belarus sanctions regime is prone to misunderstandings about the reach of the advice. The article therefore delimits itself clearly:

  • No advice on circumventing sanctions: strategies for circumventing the sanctions under the Ukraine Ordinance (SR 946.231.176.72) are not the subject of this article and are also not provided within an individual lawyer mandate. The circumvention of sanctions is sanctioned under Swiss law on the criminal- and administrative-law levels.
  • No asylum-strategy advice: this article explains the legal framework, not an individual strategy for maximising the probability of recognition of an asylum application. Such a mandate belongs in the hands of a lawyer entered in the bar register and specialised in asylum law.
  • No banking or compliance advice: KYC questions, account openings and banking compliance fall within the competence of banking and compliance legal advice as well as the banks themselves.
  • No tax advice: DTA application, international asset structures and domicile-based tax planning are not the subject of this platform.
  • No political statement: the article describes the law in force and the observable practice, without political assessment of the sanctions policy or of the geopolitical events underlying it.

This article constitutes general legal information and does not replace advice from a lawyer relating to the individual case; this delimitation follows from the law on lawyers (Federal Act on the Freedom of Movement of Lawyers, LLCA, SR 935.61). For individual sets of facts, the engagement of a lawyer entered in the cantonal bar register and specialised in migration law is required — and, depending on the constellation, additionally of a representation specialised in sanctions and external-economic law, since the two specialist fields diverge in a practice-relevant manner.

This article is updated with each new sanctions package, each published SEM directive and each relevant FAC leading ruling. The volatile subject matter demands a stale-threshold SLA of 60 days instead of the ordinary 90 days.